Analysis of the possibility of recognizing radioisotopes by measuring the absorbed dose using passive detectors



with different atomic numbers

S. Ubizskii¹, O. Poshyvak¹, <u>Ya. Zhydachevskyy</u>²





Motivation and aim of the work

The idea of ionizing irradiation source recognition utilizing measurements of absorbed dose using at least two different detectors with strongly different effective atomic numbers (Zen) has been around for a long time. However, to date, this approach has not been implemented in practice mainly due to the lack of appropriate detectors made of high atomic number materials.

The aim of this investigation is to analyze and establish a possibility to identify radioisotopes, which could be potentially used in radiation dispersal devices (RDDs), employing the absorbed dose measurements of their γ-radiation with two detectors of different Zeff-

Passive OSL/TSL detectors under consideration

The tissue equivalent BeO ceramics (Z_{eff} = 7.1) has been considered as a "light" detector material, while the single crystalline YAIO₃ (YAP) (Z_{eff} = 31.4) or LuAIO₃ (LuAP) (Z_{eff} = 61.6) have been chosen as a "heavy" one

The Mn^{2*} -activated YAP detectors have been investigated experimantally [1,2]. The LuAP is considered as a hypothetical material for dosimetry with very high Z_{efs} because the (Y-Lu)AIO₃: Mn with partial substitution of Y with Lu demonstrated similar dosimetric properties [3].



(energy deposition) upon radiation energy, obtained by Monte-Carlo simulation in [2] for 1 mm thick detectors.



Fig. 3. The probability density distributions of estimated quantities R, with parameters, presented in Table 2 for the detectors pairs YAP/BeO (a) and LuAP/BeO (b), in the assumption that the absorbed dose measurement possesses the Gaussian distribution of error and has a relative accuracy $\varepsilon_D = 0.01$ (1%).



Fig. 4. Dependencies of the radioisotope's identification error probabilities upon the relative error $_{\mathcal{E}_D}$ if the absorbed dose measurement according to the decision-making rule (6) and absorbed dose measurement using detectors pairs YAP/BeO (a) and LuAP/BeO (b).

Table 1. Isotopes can be used in RDD and their main characteristics [4, 5]

No.	Isotope	Decay	Radiation energy, MeV	Radioactive half- life, year	Specific activity, Ci/g
1.	Strontium (Sr-90)	β	0.2 (β)	28	140
2.	Plutonium (Pu-239)	α	5.1 (a)	24 100	0.063
3.	Polonium (Po-210)	α	5.3 (a)	0.4 (138.4 days)	4 500
4.	Radium (Ra-226)	α, β, γ	4.8 (α), 0.0036 (β), 0.0067 (Χ)	1 602	1.0
5.	Californium (Cf-252)	α, γ	5.9 (a), 0.0012 (X)	2.6	540
6.	Curium (Cm-244)	α, γ	5.8 (a), 0.0017 (X)	18	82
7.	Plutonium (Pu-238)	α, γ	5.5 (α), 0.0018 (X)	87.7	17
8.	Americium (Am-241)	α, γ	5.5 (a), 0.0595 (X)	458	3.5
9.	Cesium (Cs-137)	β, γ	0.19 (β), 0.6617 (γ)	30	88
10.	Iridium (Ir-192)	β, γ	0.22 (β), 0.82 (γ)	0.2 (74 days)	9 200
11.	Cobalt (Co-60)	β. γ	0.097 (β), 1.25 (γ)	5.26	1 100

Main equations used for the analysis:

The measured values of absorbed dose $(D_1 = D_{YAP} \text{ (or } D_{LuAP}) \text{ and } D_2 = D_{BeO})$:

$D_1 = S_1(E) \cdot D,$ $D_2 = S_2(E) \cdot D.$	(1)
$\frac{D_1}{D_2} = \frac{S_1(E)}{S_2(E)}$.	(2)
$R(E) = \frac{D_1}{D_2}.$	(3)
$D = \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{D_1}{D_1} + \frac{D_2}{D_2} \right),$	(4)

$$D = \frac{1}{2} \frac{R(E)}{(s_1(E) + s_2(E))},$$

$$D = \frac{1}{2} \frac{R(E)}{(D_1 + D_2 R(E))}.$$
(4)

 $2 S_2(E)^{(D_1)}$ $R(\text{Co-60}) = R_1$, $R(\text{Ir-192}) = R_2$ and $R(\text{Cs-137}) = R_3$ (see Table 2).

The decision-making rule for isotopes recognition based on the R value:

$$\begin{pmatrix} R_1, & \text{if } R < r_{12}, \\ R = \{R_2, & \text{if } r_{12} < R < r_{23}, \end{pmatrix}$$
(6)

$$(R_3, \text{ if } R > r_{23},$$

The standard deviation of the indirect measurement of the ratio $R = D_1/D_2$:

the ratio $K = \sum_{j=1}^{1/2} \left(\sigma_{D_1}^2 + R^2 \sigma_{D_2}^2 \right) / D_2^2.$ $\sigma_{R} = \left(\left(\frac{\partial R}{\partial p} \right)^{2} \left(\sigma_{D_{1}} \right)^{2} + \left(\frac{\partial R}{\partial p} \right)^{2} \left(\sigma_{D_{2}} \right)^{2} \right)^{1}$

$$(\langle \partial D_1 \rangle \langle -1 \rangle \langle \partial D_2 \rangle \langle -2 \rangle) = \sqrt{\langle D_1 \rangle \langle D_2 \rangle \langle D_1 \rangle \langle D_2 \rangle \langle D_1 \rangle \langle D_1 \rangle \langle D_2 \rangle \langle D_1 \rangle \langle D_1 \rangle \langle D_2 \rangle \langle D_1 \rangle \langle D_1 \rangle \langle D_1 \rangle \langle D_2 \rangle \langle D_1 \rangle \langle D$$

In assumption that $\sigma_{D_1} = \sigma_{D_2} = \sigma_D$ and $D_2 \approx D$ (due to very flat dependence of $S_2(E)$) equation (7) can be rewritten in the form:

$$\sigma_R = \sqrt{1 + R^2} \cdot \varepsilon_D, \tag{8}$$

where $\varepsilon_D = \sigma_D/D$ is a relative error of measurement of absorbed dose. The values of σ_D/ε_D calculated for isotopes' energies are presented in Table 2. Minimal error will occur when the border quantities r12 and r23 will satisfy equations

 $w_1(r_{12}) = w_2(r_{12}),$ (9) $w_2(r_{23}) = w_3(r_{23}).$

The error probabilities in identification of isotopes ¹³⁷Cs, ¹⁹²Ir and ⁶⁰Co:

$$P_{Co} = P_R = \frac{1}{2} \operatorname{erfc}\left(\frac{r_{12}-R_1}{r_1\sqrt{2}}\right),$$
 (10)
 $P_{1r} = P_G = \frac{1}{2} \left[\operatorname{erfc}\left(\frac{R_2-R_2}{r_2}\right) + \operatorname{erfc}\left(\frac{r_{22}-R_2}{\sigma}\right)\right],$ (11)

$$P_{\rm Cs} = P_B = \frac{1}{2} {\rm erfc} \left(\frac{R_2 - r_{23}}{\sigma_2 \sqrt{2}} \right), \tag{12}$$

where subscripts R, B, and G correspond to the colors of curves and filling in Figure 3a. The joint probability of wrong identification as a function of number n of used dosimeters: $P_i(n) \sim P_i^n$. (13)

For instance, using three dosimeters with YAP/BeO pair of detectors reduces the 192Ir isotope identification error probability from 34% to quite an acceptable level of 3.7% at the same accuracy of dose measurement characterized by $\varepsilon_D = 0.01$ (1%).

Summary

• The analysis of the possibility of identification of an unknown radiation source was performed in the context of emergency dosimetry by means of measuring the absorbed doses' values using two dosimetric detectors, light BeO and heavy YAP:Mn or LuAP, taking into account the energy dependences of their dosimetric sensitivity, and random errors appearing during measurements.

◆ According to the available sources, the number of radioisotopes which can be used by terrorists in RDDs is very limited, and only three isotopes ¹³⁷Cs, ¹⁹²Ir and ⁶⁰Co are dangerous from the point of view of external γ -irradiation.

• The performed analysis shows that the optimal identification of isotopes ¹³⁷Cs, ¹⁹²Ir and ⁶⁰Co using 1 mm thick dosimetric detectors based on YAP and BeO requires unusually high accuracy of measurements of absorbed dose or to use of a pair of detectors which have a bigger difference in observed absorbed doses ratio for the y-radiation energy range of mentioned isotopes. The possible solution may be the usage of even heavier compounds like LuAP (Z_{eff} = 61.6) or others with higher Z_{eff} instead of YAP.

• At the same time, a feasible way to increase the reliability of isotopes' identification is to solve the recognition problem using several identical dosimeters which got irradiated by the same source owing to reducing the joint error probability with an increase of a number of independent identifications

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